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Optimizing Empathic Understanding in Human Inquiry, a 
Dialogical-Hermeneutical Approach  
 
1. Conceptualizing Empathic Understanding 
Brian Fay, philosopher of science, says that empathic understanding is insufficient as 
well as unnecessary for understanding another person.1 I disagree. The main reason is 
that Fay conceives empathic understanding too narrowly and one-sidedly as being 
one or as psychic identification. Conceived in a broader sense empathic 
understanding has been indicated by several philosophers, scientists, therapists and 
counselors as indispensable for human understanding. For instance, the 
indispensability of empathic understanding in ordinary life is shown in developmental 
psychology.2 Empathic understanding has to develop on the basis of a kind of proto-
empathy, a type of emotional immersion, a bodily felt resonance with the mother. 
Neuroscience has shown that a neurophysiological mechanism is necessary for the 
development of the capacity of empathic understanding: the system of the ‘mirror-
neurons’. Malfunctioning of these ‘mirror-neurons’ may have autism as a 
consequence.3  
 
Which conception should we choose? If empathic understanding is not psychic 
identification, then what is it? I propose the following definition of ‘empathy’, which 





Empathy is the ability of placing oneself imaginatively in another’s 
experiential world while feeling and thinking into her or his experiences 
(points of view, thoughts, ideas, cognitions, desires, intentions to act, and, 
especially, motivations, feelings and emotions). 
 
 
The following important elements or implications of this definition should be kept in 
mind: 
 
(1) empathy does not mean psychic identification or being one; it has an ‘as if’ 
quality4 without becoming a sort of ‘sham-empathy’5; 
(2) empathy is not just projecting what we would feel in a situation similar to the 
situation of another; it is a trial and error, long-term, ‘tasting’ and checking process; 
(3) empathy does not mean ‘feeling with’ (‘Mitfühlung’, fellow feeling or sympathy), 
but it means ‘feeling into’ (‘Einfühlung’, ‘Nachfühlung’ or ‘Nacherleben’) the 
experiences of another; nevertheless, a sort of emotional resonance is basic;  
(4) the experiential world of the other is seen as having cognitive, affective, 
emotional and motivational dimensions;  
(5) empathy as such is an attitudinal (affective and cognitive) ability and not yet 
communicative (verbal or non-verbal) behavior; however, in the process of empathic 
understanding empathy may get a communicative character, which may improve 
empathic understanding; Frans de Waal has shown that primates also have the 
capacity of combining affective empathy, cognitive empathy and empathic behavior 
(for instance, chimpanzees and other great apes can demonstrate consolation 
behavior)6;    
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(6) empathy does not necessarily imply subscription to what is expressed; the 
empathizer may disagree with the empathizee; 
(7)  empathy neither implies ethical goodness; empathy may be used to exercise 
power, to manipulate and to hurt another;   
(8) the empathic ability has to be developed through one’s personal life; its quality is 
age-related; so, the development of empathy may have certain stages.  
 
Having defined ‘empathy’ we can define ‘empathic understanding’ as follows: 
 
 
Empathic understanding is understanding another person on the basis of 
empathy; this understanding is directed at comprehending or explaining the 




Or, more shortly: 
 
 
Empathic understanding is placing oneself imaginatively in another’s 
experiential world by feeling and thinking into this world with the aim of 
comprehending these experiences. 
 
 
Comprehension does not imply sympathy or approval; it is a type of interpretive 
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explanation. Neither empathy nor empathic understanding imply actually 
experiencing the mental state of the other or showing the behavior of the other. 
Although empathic understanding will still be insufficient for complete understanding 
of another person in all respects, it will be necessary and feasible. Admittedly, this 
conception expresses why understanding another is difficult and may fail, but it also 
expresses that empathic understanding is not a hopeless endeavor. Empathic 
understanding is possible. It is not a mystery. It is not white magic. As a matter of 
fact, empathic understanding is a necessary condition for understanding others in 
ordinary life, for keeping personal mental health and for maintaining human societies. 
Moreover, during a lifetime or during learning processes empathic understanding can 
be improved within communicative processes. Because optimizing the development 
of empathic understanding needs communication, a conceptualization of optimal 
empathic understanding must include a socially behavioral dimension in addition to 
the dimension of attitudinal or mental ability.  
 
Anton van Strien differentiates between five phases or facets of the process of 
empathic understanding of another person7: 
 
- affective empathy or empathic resonance; the empathizer participates, in an 
‘as if’ mode, in the experiential world of another person; simulation or imitation may 
be the case on this level; 
- cognitive empathy; the empathizer analyses and interprets the perceived 
affective experiences and behaviors of another; using a primitive theory of mind may 
be the case; 
- expressed empathy; the empathizer expresses his or her experienced empathy, 
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verbally or nonverbally; in an interview situation empathic understanding should be 
shown to the interviewee to have an effect; and also in a situation of giving (health) 
care to express empathy may be an essential contribution to the effectiveness of care 
giving; 
- received empathy; the empathizee has to accept the expressed empathy; this 
responsivity is necessary to get good rapport between the researcher and the 
researched; so, we could also speak of responsive empathy; in a situation of 
qualitative interviewing or giving health care responsivity may improve the 
effectiveness;  
- interactional empathy; the empathizer and the empathizee interact; they react 
appropriately to each other, especially concerning the aspect of empathic 
understanding; in the interactive process empathic understanding is expressed, 
received, accepted, affirmed and stimulated.    
 
We observe that the affective and cognitive types of empathy are of a mental or 
attitudinal nature and the other three types are of a socially behavioral or 
communicative nature.  
 
2. Optimizing Empathic Understanding 
I want to modify and extend this series (or spiral) from Van Strien in three respects. 
First, I add a third, hermeneutical-interpretive type (in short interpretive empathy) to 
the mental types: 
 
- interpretive empathy; a hermeneutical approach to empathic understanding 
implies that the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the interpreting empathizer has to 
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be understood and interpreted by means of a process characterized by the so-called 
hermeneutical circle; in the hermeneutical circle parts of the behavior of the 
researched empathizee are interpreted and re-interpreted from the whole, and the 
whole is interpreted and re-interpreted from the parts; this understanding and 
interpreting process is a checking and validating process; this interpreting process 
also implies self-clarification and self-understanding on the part of the interpreting 
empathizer because his or her for-understandings or pre-suppositions are being 
confronted by the behavior of the researched; in addition, societal, cultural and 
historical aspects are included in the interpretive process. In addition, the other is also 
interpreting his or her own behavior, thoughts, feelings, etc. So, understanding 
another empathically implies a ‘double hermeneutics’8; besides, the social dimension 
of empathic understanding also stimulates the empathizer’s self-clarification, self-




Secondly, in our opinion, the set of mental types of empathy (affective, cognitive, 
interpretive empathy) and the set of social types of empathy (expressed, received, 
interactional empathy) can be combined, because these two sets can be seen as 
independent dimensions; we can construct a cross product of these sets or dimensions 
(see Figure 1). The mental types may exist without a social dimension, but they need 
a social dimension as indicated to be optimized as well as to be made more effective 
or worthwhile in professional situations such as doing interviews and giving health 
care. However, the social types cannot exist without a mental dimension. Therefore, 
the social dimension has also a value ‘not expressed’, a kind of zero-value. In 
situations of professional care giving, counseling, education, research-interviewing 
and participative inquiry the mental as well as the social dimension of empathic 
understanding should be optimized. Explicit training courses will be indicative. 
Hence, the 3x4 cross table in Figure 1 represents a typology of twelve types of 
empathic understanding of which the dialogical-hermeneutical type is the most 
optimal one.  
 
Thirdly, the affective phase or facet of the mental dimension of empathy (empathic 
resonance), which is based on emotional and bodily-felt experiences, but which is not 
proto-empathy anymore, may be expressed verbally as well as non-verbally. The 
expressed embodiment of affective empathy may be received and responded to in 
body language.    
 
This typology has to be understood in the following way. The affective type of 
empathic understanding is basic and influences the cognitive and interpretive type (in 
the hermeneutical sense). The interpretive type of empathic understanding is 
8 
 
nourished by the affective and cognitive types. Thus, besides the cognitive 
component the interpretive type has an affective component. This affective 
component may be expressed or not. It may be expressed verbally or non-verbally. 
The embodiment of affective empathy may also be not expressed or expressed, 
noticed (received) or interactively exchanged. In addition, the expressed type of 
empathic understanding influences the received and interactive types. The received 
type influences the interactive type. Hence, the interactive type of empathic 
understanding is nourished by expressing and receiving empathy. (Of course, there 
are mutual influences between two mental or two social types of empathy. These and 
other reciprocal relationships between types are not expressed in Figure 1 for reasons 
of simplicity of presentation.) Therefore, a combination of the interpretive and the 
interactive types of empathic understanding will deliver the most optimal variation of 
empathic understanding. I call this type or variation dialogical-hermeneutical 
empathic understanding. This type of understanding implies self-clarification on the 
part of the interpreting empathizer because his or her for-understandings or pre-
suppositions are being confronted by the behavior of the researched; the dialogical 
character implies that the interactions show mutual respect and appreciation, a double 
hermeneutics, openness and a striving for communicative symmetry.9  
 
The dialogical-hermeneutic type of empathic understanding also includes a narrative 
dimension of optimal empathic understanding. Ruthellen Josselson says: ‘The 
empathic stance orients us as researchers to other people’s experience and meaning-
making, which is communicated to us through narrative. To understand another 




Thus, the conceptual structure in Figure 1 expresses that optimized empathic 
understanding always has both mental facets (or phases) and social facets (or phases). 
Conceived in this way empathic understanding does have an intrinsic device for being 
checked, tested, reformulated and developed further. This built-in self-validation 
implies a two-way device: a mental way, the hermeneutical circle, and a social way, 
the interactive process. These two self-validating processes should be intertwined. 
Within this intertwining process of validation cognitive, interpretive as well as 
affective moments play their part.     
 
Empathic understanding as conceptualized above has a special significance for human 
research when this research has a participatory character, an emancipatory aim or a 
goal of empowerment. Indeed, the social dimension implies that the other, the 
empathizee, may develop his or her self-understanding, may develop a better 
understanding of his or her situation, and may have the experience of being taken 
seriously and being respected. Because of the built-in twofold self-validation 
(mentally and socially) empathic understanding can be a method for doing scientific 
research. 
 
3. Imagination and Inclusiveness 
We have defined empathic understanding as placing oneself imaginatively in 
another’s experiential world while thinking and feeling into her or his experiences 
with the aim of comprehending these experiences. According to the philosopher 
Maxine Greene “imagination is what, above all, makes empathy possible”, because 
imagination is the cognitive capacity that permits us to give credence to alternative 
possibilities.11 It allows us to break with what we take for granted and to enter into 
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the alien world of another person, to discover how it looks and feels from the vantage 
point of that other. We need not approve or appreciate it, but we grasp it as a human 
possibility. We learn to look at things as if they could be otherwise; we break with 
what is supposedly fixed and finished from our personal point of view. Greene’s 
conception of imagination comes very close to that of the philosophers John Dewey 
and Iris Murdoch, who hold that imagination results from the consciousness of a gap 
between the actual and the possible, from the awareness that our reality goes beyond 
‘mere fact’. According to Murdoch we can only reach reality through the strength and 
refinement of imagination, which she describes as “a type of reflection on people, 
events, etc., which builds detail, adds colour, conjures up possibilities in ways which 
go beyond what could be said to be strictly factual.” 12 From these perspectives, Hans 
Alma comes to the definition of imagination as an exploration of possibilities that 
transcend the boundaries of ‘mere fact.’ 13 Of course, improving our imaginative 
capacity helps to optimize our hermeneutical and dialogical competence within 
empathic understanding. 
 
Up till now, an important question has been ignored: who are the empathizees? In my 
opinion empathic understanding is not optimal at all if the group of empathizees is 
very small or selective. The more inclusive empathic understanding is, the more we 
are capable to understand others who differ from us regarding their ideas, beliefs, 
opinions, convictions, moral values, philosophy of life, worldview, cultural and social 
heritage, etc. Inclusiveness means pushing back frontiers, removing boundaries 
between ‘we’ and ‘they’. Inclusive empathic understanding is desirable in human 
inquiry as well as in social, cultural and political life. This is especially true in the 
context of a multicultural society.  
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Inclusiveness of empathic understanding may be developed and improved by, for 
instance, using imagination, collecting and digesting information, education, critical 
self-reflection, discovering and neutralizing prejudgments and wrong or bad 
interpretations with the help of hermeneutical analysis, and, of course, by having true 
dialogues with the others. One could say that inclusive empathic understanding 
means a greater competence to understand others as well as a higher level of moral 
maturity.14             
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